I. The Security Council context: Threat to International Peace and Security
In order fully to understand the relationship between the Peace Agreement and the Tribunal, the former must be placed in the context of the relevant Security Council resolutions on the former Yugoslavia. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has ..primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", 10 and the Charter itself prevails over Member States" obligations under any other international agreement. 11 The Council was seized of the situation in the former Yugoslavia before the signing of the Peace Agreement, having determined in a number of resolutions that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and thus it has primary responsibility for the situation in the region. In recognition of this primacy, the Agreement "invites" the Council to authorize the implementation of the Agreement acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"). 12 Since the Peace Agreement assumes a continuing threat to international peace and security, as determined by the Security Council, the reasons for the Tribunal's establishment remain in effect, at least for the time being. 13 Since the signing of the Peace Agreement, moreover, the Security Council has been careful to retain jurisdiction over its implementation. In authorizing the Agreement it has determined ,,that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security", 14 and has expressed ,4ts intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement under review". 15 In resolution 1022 (1995), the Council decided that if either the High Representative or the Commander of the IFOR report that FRY or the Bosnian Serb authorities, i.e. RS, ,,are failing significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement", it will automatically reimpose sanctions against them. The question is: what would constitute significant failure to co-operate with the Tribunal under the Peace Agreement?
II. Co-operation with the Tribunal by the Parties

A. The General Framework Agreement
The General Framework Agreement ("GFA"), signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("RBH"), the Republic of Croatia and FRY, affirms the duty to cooperate with the Tribunal in three ways. First, Article DC provides that:
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.
The Tribunal clearly falls within the compass of this provision, despite the glaring failure to mention it by name. 16 Second, the Parties agree to ,,fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made" in the Annexes to the Agreement, which contain provisions which do specifically mention co-operation with the Tribunal. Third, FRY undertakes to ensure compliance with the Peace Agreement by RS, 17 which is a signatory to the Annexes. Therefore, by signing the GFA, FRY acting on its own behalf and on behalf of RS has recognized, and undertaken to co-operate with, the Tribunal. This duty of co-operation is further elaborated in the Annexes.
B. The Annexes to the Agreement
A number of articles in the Annexes explicitly refer to the Tribunal, while others implicate the Tribunal without mentioning it by name. Those which mention the Tribunal cover subjects falling into five broad categories: 1. General Commitment to Co-operate; 2. Freedom of Movement and Unrestricted Access; 3. Repatriation of Prisoners of War; 4. Exclusion from Public Office; and 5. Amnesty.
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This is a blatant omission. Article X of Annex 1-A is virtually identical save it includes the phrase, "including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia". 17
See the Preamble, ..Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly ...". In side-letters, FRY has also pledged to ensure RS"s compliance with Annex 1-A, and Croatia has undertaken to ensure compliance by "personnel or organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are under its control or with which it has influence", i. Access to sites is important to the Tribunal in the investigation of possible mass graves. 24 The majority of such sites are in the territory of RS. 25 RS is a party to Annexes 1-A and 6, and has approved, in a separate declaration, Annex 4. Its compliance with Annex 1-A is additionally underwritten by FRY.
The discovery of mass graves may help to demonstrate a systematic campaign of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 26 although oral testimony attesting to mass killings may be sufficiently probative in itself. The importance of access to suspected mass grave sites was recently affirmed by the Security Council in resolution 1034 (1995) of 21 December 1995. This strongly-worded resolution indicates the Council"s firm intention to remain seized of the matter and to dictate the terms of the Parties" compliance with the Agreement. The resolution is worth quoting at length:
The Security Council... *» 7. Takes note that the International Tribunal... issued on 16 November 1995 indictments against the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for their direct and individual responsibilities for the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995; 8. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give immediate and unrestricted access to the areas in question, including for the purpose of the investigation of the atrocities, to representatives of the relevant United Nations and other international organizations and institutions... 9. Underlines in particular the urgent necessity for all the parties to enable the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal to gather effectively and swiftly the evidence necessary for the Tribunal to perform its task; 10. Stresses the obligations of all the parties to cooperate with and provide unrestricted It may be inferred from this resolution that failure by RS to provide "unrestricted access to the areas in question" would constitute a serious breach of both RS's and FRY's obligations under the Peace Agreement, and would be a ground for the reimposition of sanctions under resolution 1022, provided that the Security Council were first seized of such non-compliance by the High Representative or the IFOR Commander. As discussed below, the Council's perception of the gravity of the breach might influence the views of these officials.
Repatriation of Prisoners of War
Article IX(l)(g) of Annex 1-A provides:
... each Party shall comply with any order or request of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for the arrest, detention, surrender of or access to persons who would otherwise be released and transferred under this Article, but who are accused of violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Each Party must detain persons reasonably suspected of such violations for a period of time sufficient to permit appropriate consultation with Tribunal authorities.
This paragraph has to be read in conjunction with paragraph (c) of the same article, which provides for the release and transfer of all prisoners held by the Parties within thirty days of the transfer of authority from the UNPROFOR Commander to the IFOR Commander. Exchange of prisoners has now officially taken place, although many may remain in custody, without resulting in the surrender of accused to the Tribunal under Article IX(l)(g), a provision which was not, in any event, designed to result in leaders being surrendered to The Hague.
Exclusion from Public Office
The Peace Agreement contains a number of "office-barring" clauses, most notably in Annex 4, "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Article IX(1) of this Annex reads:
No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold
The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The natural interpretation of this provision is that it is a corollary of a Constitution which is ..determined to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law" and is ,,guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations". 28 It does not imply that exclusion from public office is an alternative to being tried by the Tribunal; rather it would be a further "sanction" to ensure the appearance of the accused before the Tribunal. Arguably, a private citizen is also easier to arrest than a public official, and the latter might try to claim sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the fact that Article 7(2) of the Tribunal's Statute provides that, ,,[t]he official position of any accused person ... shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility ...". In any event, the main purpose of the provision is to reflect the value judgement that a person convicted by the Tribunal, or indicted and failing to appear before it to defend himself, is not fit for public office.
The phrase, ,,and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal", in Article IX(1) of Annex 4 is unfortunate, since the Tribunal does not have a practice of ordering persons to appear before it, but of issuing arrest warrants addressed to States. 29 Such an order could, of course, be issued as a summons under Rule 54 of the Rules if ..necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial". Equally, it could be argued that an arrest warrant which has been brought to the attention of the accused operates as a form of summons.
Amnesty
Article VI of Annex 7, which addresses the sensitive issue of amnesty, reads:
Any returning refugee or displaced person charged with a crime, other than a serious violation of international humanitarian law as defined in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991 or a common crime unrelated to the conflict, shall upon return enjoy an amnesty. In no case shall charges for crimes be imposed for political or other inappropriate reasons or to circumvent the application of the amnesty. II contemplates amnesty only for having participated in the fighting, and not for having committed violations of international humanitarian law while so participating. The absence of any amnesty for those accused by the Tribunal underscores the point that the Peace Agreement must comply with previous Security Council resolutions relating to the former Yugoslavia, in particular those establishing the Tribunal. An amnesty for those accused of genocide 32 might, in any event, be contrary to jus cogens and therefore void.
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Many articles could also be invoked in the Tribunal's favour which do not specifically mention it by name, notably articles which remind the parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law, 34 or which refer to co-operation with international organizations or personnel. An example of the latter is Article 111(2) of Annex 7, which could be relied upon to provide the Tribunal's investigators with access to refugees and displaced persons for the purposes of taking statements regarding the circumstances of their displacement -an activity "vital to the discharge of their mandate".
A number of clauses mention co-operation with non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). 35 In the early stages of an investigation, the Tribunal often receives valuable information from NGOs.
36 It is also significant that whereas before the Peace Agreement, the Parties were not strictly required to co-operate with NGOs, as they were required by Security Council resolutions to co-operate with the Tribunal, the relevant clauses now impose such a requirement. The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal er the power to report to the Council significant non-compliance by either RS or FRY. The Council will then reimpose sanctions against those parties, without the need of a decision, after 5 days, ..unless the Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature of the non-compliance". Thus sanctions will be reimposed automatically unless members of the Security Council decide to the contrary (although such a decision could of course be vetoed by one of the permanent members).
The provision for sanctions is, however, subject to an important qualification: it may terminate after six to nine months. Operative paragraph 4 of the resolution stipulates that the Council will terminate sanctions "on the tenth day following the occurrence of the first free and fair elections provided for in annex 3 of the Peace Agreement ...", which are due to take place, under annex 3, six months after the Agreement enters into force or, if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe deems a delay necessary, "no later than nine months after entry into force" (Article 11 (4)). This raises the issue: what if it proves impossible to organize free and fair elections in that time, given the conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably the many hundreds of thousands of refugees? Presumably the termination of sanctions under resolution 1022 would then have to await such elections, even if they were not to be held for a year or more. It should be added that, if elections are held in time, termination would not be automatic; operative paragraph 5 of the resolution refers to termination "by a subsequent Council decision in accordance with paragraph 4 above", clearly indicating that the Council must take a decision to terminate sanctions. A permanent member could veto this decision if there were continuing non-compliance by the FRY or RS. Indeed, the prospect of using the veto in these circumstances may have been hinted at by the United States Representative during the debates on resolution 1022:
.... compliance by the Bosnian Serbs cannot be assumed. After the siege of Sarajevo, the market-place shelling, the years of "ethnic cleansing" and the unforgivable savagery at Srebrenica, the world has had enough of Bosnian Serb arrogance and brutality. Their compliance with this agreement must be demanded by the Government in Belgrade; it must be demanded by this Council; and it must be demanded by every civilized person on earth.^7 If the two conditions demanded by paragraph 4 were met, namely free and fair elections and withdrawal from the zones of separation, but the Bosnian Serbs were recalcitrant in other areas, for example refusing to co-operate with the Tribunal, sanctions might still not be terminated. To terminate sanctions in the face of barefaced non-compliance with "an essential aspect of implementing the Peace Agreement" would appear to be inconsistent with the entire spirit of resolution 1022 (1995) .
The sanctions suspended under resolution 1022 are contained in a number of resolutions against FRY and, to a lesser extent, RS (notably resolution 942(1994)). The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal with the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, 41 which include such issues as humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees, election arrangements, and, notably, co-operation with the Tribunal. The IFOR Commander is responsible for enforcing compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement (Annex 1-A) , which includes provisions regarding co-operation with the Tribunal, free movement of investigators, including access to sites, and access to prisoners held by the Parties.
Resolution 1031 (1995) confirms that the IFOR Commander and the High Representative have ,/inal authority to interpret" 42 the military and civilian aspects of the Agreement, respectively.' This would seem to imply that the Security Council is not competent to determine, proprio motu, non-compliance by a Party, although the words, ,4n theatre", could be construed to mean that the Council, being ,,out of theatre", is not subject to this ,/inal authority". Resolution 1031 (1995) would then represent a partial delegation of power by the Security Council to the IFOR Commander and High Representative, the Council however retaining a residual power to determine, at least, a Party's non-cooperation with the Tribunal. It is possible to imagine tension arising where there is substantial non-cooperation with the Tribunal by RS or FRY, but neither the High Representative nor the IFOR Commander consider it a significant breach of the Parties' obligations under the Peace Agreement. The Security Council would, on the above theory, not be barred from adopting new resolutions to condemn and, if necessary, to apply sanctions against RS and FRY for non-cooperation. Since it has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, its resolutions might also mould the views of the IFOR Commander and the High Representative as to the interpretation of the Agreement and of what constitutes significant non-compliance.
It is salient to note that the Tribunal's Rules 43 provide for direct notification to the Security Council where a State fails to co-operate: a useful safeguard against inaction by the High Representative or the IFOR Commander. A finding by a Trial Chamber that failure to execute an arrest warrant is due to the failure of a State to co-operate may implicitly involve finding that a Party has failed to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement. 44 This judicial determination would be independent of, and not subject to, the High Representative's ,,final authority to interpret" the Agreement^ Thus a system of ,,checks and balances" may emerge in which the High Representative's ,,final authority" to interpret civilian implementation of the as operating alongside national courts. For these reasons, Holbrooke's .Jules of the road" represent more of a realpolitik stop-gap, bom of ^shuttle diplomacy", than a long-term solution. .
Co-operation with the Tribunal by Non-Parties
Having considered the position of States and Entities under the Agreement, it is pertinent to note the impact which the various international organizations and human rights bodies established by the Agreement may have on the Tribunal's activities.
A. The Implementation Force -IFOR
The deployment of the IFOR may facilitate the work of the Tribunal by creating a secure environment for investigators to interview witnesses and examine important sites. Additionally, IFOR may have the authority to effect the Tribunal's arrest warrants, in contrast to the United Nations Protection Force ("UNPROFOR") which was understood to have no such power. 46 Annex 1-A does not explicitly confer on IFOR the authority to execute the Tribunal's arrest warrants. Nevertheless, it is clear that IFOR, unlike UNPROFOR, may use force to accomplish its task, 47 and its task is to ensure compliance by the Parties with Annex 1-A. Compliance includes cooperation with the Tribunal under Article X, and co-operation pre-eminently involves the arrest of accused persons.
The Parties to Annex 1-A cannot gainsay their duty to arrest accused persons. If they do not make the arrests themselves, they may be deemed to have granted IFOR the authority to do so on their behalf, since those arrests are "actions ... required ... to ensure compliance" with Annex 1-A. They have also agreed, under Article VI(4), that ..further directives from the NAC (North Atlantic Council) may establish additional duties and responsibilities for the IFOR in implementing this Annex"; thus the North Atlantic Council could simply confer on IFOR the duty or responsibility, whenever possible, to execute the Tribunal's arrest warrants. 
The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal
Statesmen and IFOR officials have also repeatedly stated that they do have the authority, under certain circumstances, to arrest persons. 48 These statements have not been contradicted by the Parties, who may be considered, therefore, to have acquiesced in them.
Two arguments might be made that IFOR has not only the right but also the duty to execute the Tribunal's arrest warrants. The first argument derives from the Tribunal's Rules and the overriding obligation of all States to comply with the Tribunal's orders pursuant to Resolution 827 (1993) . If an accused ..resides, or was last known to be, or is believed by the Registrar to be likely to be found" in an area of Bosnia and Herzegovina under IFOR's .jurisdiction or control", 49 then an arrest warrant may be transmitted under Rule 55 of the Rules to the national authorities of the State in control of that sector, which are then under a duty to execute it. For example, the United States contingent of the IFOR currently has responsibility for the operational area which includes Srebrenica. If the Registrar believed an accused to be in Srebrenica, she could send an arrest warrant to the appropriate authorities of the United States, which would then have the duty to execute the arrest warrant.
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Second, it may be argued that a duty to execute the Tribunal's arrest warrants arises, where the accused is charged under Article 2 of the Statute ("Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949"), from the troop-contributing States' obligation under the four Geneva Conventions "to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed ... grave breaches, and (to) bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before (their) own courts". 51 Once the accused are before the national courts, which would include courts-martial convened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the State must either try the person or extradite him to another High Contracting Party for trial. Since the Tribunal is, like a High Contracting Party, competent to prosecute persons for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, its position could be equated, at the very least, with that of a Party receiving extradited persons. With the exception of Milan Martic, all of the fifty-two persons so far indicted by the Tribunal are alleged to have committed, inter alia, grave breaches. The Geneva Conventions may therefore require, and certainly authorize, troopcontributing States to search for and arrest those accused.
In order to provide for the transmission of arrest warrants to IFOR, the Judges of the Tribunal adopted a new Rule at the Ninth Plenary Session on 17-18 January 1996. Rule 59 bis of the Rules provides, in part, that:
(A) Notwithstanding Rules 55 to 59, on the order of a Judge, the Registrar shall transmit to an appropriate authority or international body a copy of a warrant for the arrest of an accused, on such terms as the Judge may determine, together with an order for his prompt transfer to the Tribunal in the event that he be taken into custody by that authority or international body... This Rule was adopted to take account of the fact that Rules 55 to 59 were drafted with States, and not international organizations, in mind. Arguably, Rule 54 would, in any event, permit the transmission of such orders and warrants to IFOR, since it is a general rule enabling a Judge or Trial Chamber to ,,issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial". Notably, the Tribunal's Statute does not exclude the possibility of arrest by international bodies; Article 20(2) of the Statute is drafted in general language not limited to arrest by States.
B. The International Police Task Force
The principal interest of the International Police Task Force ("IPTF'), for the Tribunal, is that it shall provide it with information concerning human rights violations. The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal Article IV(3). The IPTF will consider requests for assistance from the Parties, but it is not required to consider such requests from the Tribunal. As regards the Parties, the "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina" stipulates that international criminal law enforcement is the responsibility of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not of the Entities. 53 Accordingly, it may only be Bosnia and Herzegovina which can request the IPTF to arrest persons accused by the Tribunal, and such a request could always be blocked by the Entities exercising their "veto".
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The IPTF may prove a useful resource, readily available oh the ground, as observers for the questioning of suspects who may be delivered to The Tribunal. Since interrogation is a ,Jaw enforcement activity", the monitoring, observing and inspecting of which falls within the IPTF's mandate, 55 IPTF officers could be employed to observe whether any such interrogation adequately respects the rights of suspects and is otherwise properly conducted. Since statements made by suspects or accused under interrogation may often be challenged by the defence at trial, on the basis that the evidence was improperly obtained, it may be useful for the Tribunal to be able to call IPTF personnel to testify as to the conditions under which such statements were made, in order to ascertain whether they are admissible.
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C. Commission on Human Rights
Annex 6 to the Agreement, "Agreement on Human Rights", provides for the creation of a Commission on Human Rights, 57 consisting of an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber, which may receive complaints of human rights violations by Parties from ,,any Party or person, non-governmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by any Party or acting on behalf of alleged victims who are deceased or missing ...*'.
58 These organs are authorised to gather information, publish findings and conclusions, and bring pressure to bear upon Parties to ensure that they respect human rights, including violations of international humanitarian law. These activities are of obvious interest to the Tribunal. To take an example: the Commission, receiving an application from a person ,,acting on behalf of alleged victims who are deceased or missing", might investigate an allegation that a person has been killed and buried in a mass grave, in violation of their right to life. 59 Or, it might investigate a complaint that a Party has violated, or is continuing to violate, the Genocide Convention 1948, 60 for example, by refusing to allow refugees to return to their homes as part of a continuing policy of "ethnic cleansing". If these investigations revealed evidence of widespread or systematic abuses, the Tribunal could subpoena the evidence under Rule 54 of the Rules. Equally, the Prosecutor could request information under Rule 8 of the Rules.
There is bound to be overlap between the work of the Commission and that of the Tribunal, 61 especially considering that both the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber are mandated to give ..particular priority to allegations of especially severe or systematic violations and those founded on alleged discrimination on prohibited grounds"(Articles V(3) and VIII(2)(e)). The danger of overlap is, however, substantially reduced by the fact that the Commission will investigate complaints against States and Entities, whereas the Tribunal prosecutes only ,,natural persons". The Commission shall have the power to effect any transactions necessary to transfer or assign title, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of property with respect to which a claim is made, or which is determined to be abandoned. In particular, the Commission may lawfully sell, mortgage; or lease real property to any resident or citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to either Party, where the lawful owner has sought and received compensation in lieu of return, or where the property is determined to be abandoned in accordance with local law. The Commission may also lease property pending consideration and final determination of ownership.
These are wide-ranging powers, which could make the Commission a very effective restitutionary device for the Tribunal. The Commission could also settle claims for compensation, as distinct from restitution of proceeds, on the basis of a judgement transmitted to the Commission under Rule 106 of the Rules, where die ,,injury to a victim" involves loss of property, since the Commission's mandate extends to ..claims for just compensation in lieu of return".
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E. Commission of Inquiry
In side-letters to the Peace Agreement, die President of RBH, Alija Izetbegovic, and the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, agreed to establish ,,an international commission of inquiry into the recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia". 65 According to diese side-letters, the commission ,,will include participation by the governments of the states involved, as well as distinguished international experts to be named by agreement among the Republics of former Yugoslavia", and its mandate will be ,,to conduct fact-finding and other necessary studies into the causes, conduct, and consequences of the recent conflict on as broad and objective a basis as possible, and to issue a report thereon, to be made available to all interested countries and organizations". Both Presidents pledge the full co-operation of their respective governments with die Commission.
The fact that the Commission's experts must be named ,,by agreement among the Republics of the former Yugoslavia", and are therefore political appointees, raises substantial doubts about its bona fides. A panel of experts selected by an independ- 
IV. Conclusion
The key to the Peace Agreement lies in its strict enforcement, since the Party which has shown itself most willing to co-operate with the Tribunal, RBH, 66 has been the least able to do so, and those Parties most implicated by the Tribunal's work, RS and FRY, have been the least willing, indeed have resolutely refused, to co-operate.
67
The Peace Agreement establishes an important mechanism for ensuring compliance with its terms by RS and FRY, namely the threat that sanctions will be automatically reimposed. Enforcement in turn depends on the will of the international community. In the words of the then Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, ,,the very stability of international order and the principle of civilization is at stake over the question of Bosnia", 68 and, by the same token, over the enforcement of the Peace Agreement. 
